MEMO/02/94
Brussels, 15 May 2002
Questions & Answers – US Farm Bill
The "Farm Security
and Rural Investment Act of 2002" replaces the "FAIR Act of
1996" and sets out various agricultural programmes under 10 titles,
notably the commodity (farm subsidy) programmes, conservation and trade. It
will last for 6 years.
The projected spending
on commodities is projected to be in the order of $15–20 billion per year for
crops alone, which represents a 70% increase (some calculations put the
spending higher at an 80% increase) on the amount foreseen at the end of the
FAIR Act. The overall Farm Bill budget has been calculated in the US on a
10-year basis at $180 billion. As the Farm Bill will have a price-depressing
effect on world markets, and in the absence of a dramatic increase in demand,
the cost is likely to be in the higher range of the estimates.
The US Farm Bill is a
staggeringly complex piece of legislation and as yet (mid-May) not even the
leading US farm policy analysts have worked out the full economic and trade
effects, including its repercussions for international trade and prices. In
particular, as the main thrust of the subsidy regime is "counter-cyclical",
it has the effect of cancelling out market signals. This means that farmers
will continue to over-produce in times of surplus.
While analyses continue,
it is already evident from world-wide reaction to the Farm Bill, that the US,
in choosing to aid farmers in a highly production-distorting way, has lost any
claim to be a credible force for farm policy reform in the WTO agriculture
negotiations. In addition, by subsidising its farmers to the maximum level of
its current ceilings under WTO, the US restricts its ability to accept further
reductions in production-distorting support in the frame of the WTO agriculture
negotiations.
In the crop sector,
three types of subsidy payments are proposed:
1.
Fixed decoupled
payments. This subsidy is set for each eligible crop grown in a reference
period. The farmer receives a set payment each year. To an extent, this payment
is a continuation of the existing "AMTA payments", introduced under
the FAIR Act. However, in a reversal of AMTA policy, the new subsidy remains
constant (AMTA decreased over time), and rates are even set higher than the
current AMTA rates. Payments are extended to soya beans and minor oilseeds.
2.
Loan payments are
made under the "loan rate" programme; most are paid as "loan
deficiency payments" or LDPs. While there are various mechanisms, in
essence, farmers are paid the difference between a fixed price (the "loan
rate", which varies by region) and a local "market" price (in
fact a price estimated by the US administration for each county where crops are
produced). If, when the farmer claims the LDP (which he can do after selling
the crop), this market price is below the loan rate, the difference is made up
with a direct subsidy. LDPs are "counter-cyclical" in nature, since
more is paid when prices are low, and vice verse. The LDP programme is extended
for the first time to pulse crops (chickpeas, dry peas and lentils). Otherwise
the Farm Bill boosts payments under the current FAIR Act programme by an average
of about 5% (ranging between a reduction of 5% for soya beans to an increase of
16% for wheat).
3.
NEW counter-cyclical payments. These subsidies are
paid when the overall income of farmers for different crops (i.e. the market
return, plus the fixed decoupled payment, plus the LDP) falls below a certain
target price. However, this payment is made on the basis of what the farmer had
grown in the reference period, irrespective of what is grown on the farm in the
current year. In fact, this flexibility is largely irrelevant for most US
arable lands, since farmers will inevitably sow the same crops as they grew in
the reference years. There was no provision for this third level of top-up
under the FAIR Act. However, from 1998, the US government introduced annual
"emergency packages" in response to price falls. The new
counter-cyclical payments provide a guarantee that the extra finance provided
by until now by "emergency" payments will be available every year.
Farmers must either farm the eligible land or put it to a "conservation
use". However, some crops are prohibited, such as wild rice, fruits,
vegetables (except pulses), and perennial crops.
|
2002/03
|
US $/bushel
(minor oilseed & cotton: per lb; rice: per cwt)
|
Equivalent $/metric ton
|
|
Fixed rate
|
Loan rate
|
Target price
|
Fixed rate
|
Loan rate
|
Target price
|
|
Maize
|
0.28
|
1.98
|
2.60
|
11.02
|
77.95
|
102.36
|
|
Sorghum
|
0.35
|
1.98
|
2.54
|
13.78
|
77.95
|
100.00
|
|
Wheat
|
0.52
|
2.80
|
3.86
|
19.11
|
102.88
|
141.83
|
|
Barley
|
0.24
|
1.88
|
2.21
|
11.02
|
86.35
|
101.51
|
|
Oats
|
0.024
|
1.35
|
1.40
|
1.65
|
93.00
|
96.45
|
|
Soybeans
|
0.44
|
5.00
|
5.80
|
16.17
|
183.72
|
213.11
|
|
m.
oilseed
|
0.008
|
0.0960
|
0.0980
|
17.64
|
211.64
|
216.05
|
|
u.
cotton
|
0.0667
|
0.5200
|
0.7240
|
147.05
|
1146.39
|
1635.81
|
|
Rice
|
2.35
|
6.50
|
10.50
|
51.8
|
143.30
|
231.49
|
Table 1. Arable rates.
The "fixed rate" represents a payment
level. Both the "loan rate" and "target price" are target
levels of return to be attained as necessary by subsidy payments.
At present, producers
receive direct payments on the basis of areas planted during an historical
period and yields obtained in the early-to-mid-1980s. The Farm Bill allows an
updating of areas eligible for direct payments (to 1998-2001 areas actually
planted) and allows an updating of eligible yields (to 93.5% of 1998/2001
yields) for the counter-cyclical payments. The implication of this is that
there could be a substantial increase in the budget cost of fixed and
counter-cyclical payments.
In respect of the
current fixed payments (AMTA), although the rates are set per crop, they are
only paid on crops grown in the base years. As they are not paid on crops grown
in the payment year, they qualify as "decoupled" payments, which the
US classifies as being exempt from WTO subsidy limitations. However, in
allowing the base areas to be updated, the payments, for the first year at
least become "re-coupled" to the recent crops grown and farmers will
receive the payments for the different crops according to their recent actual
plantings. For subsequent years, US farmers may also conclude that the US
government has created an expectation that future updating of base crops will
be allowed, thus further breaking the decoupled status of the fixed payments.
Analysis is still not
complete (at mid-May). However, one reliable analyst has estimated that the
cost of the fixed subsidy and the counter-cyclical payments will be in the
region of $11–11.5 billion annually. Payments under the loan programme in
recent years have been in the range of $6–8 billion and similar spending could
be incurred if prices stay at recent levels.
The bulk of these
payments will go to larger producers. Historically, 8% of farms have benefited
from 47% of the subsidies.
To arrive at the full
support cost, payments for dairy, sugar, peanuts, and other products as well as
subsidised revenue insurance schemes need to be added.
-
These payments
guarantee the US farmer a given level of income. This means he or she has no
interest to follow market signals, particularly in times of low prices.
-
Because of the
way the mechanism works, lower prices can mean in fact farmers gain a higher
income than they would if market prices were higher. This can operate as
disincentive to cutting back overproduction.
-
Since guaranteed
income means guaranteed return on everything grown, farmers will expand
production as much as possible on marginal land, with no concern whether of not
the crop will find a buyer at a good price.
-
The increased
production will flood the market, and further drive down prices (while incomes
are protected by yet higher LDP and counter-cyclical payments). This is why
leading US commentators describe the policy as "ultimately
self-defeating".
-
The US exports as
much as 25% of its farm production, rising to over 40% for some commodities,
like wheat. The LDP and counter-cyclical programmes result in those exports
being cheaper and thus subsidised onto the world market.
-
By cheapening
prices at home, the US market becomes unattractive to potential importers,
particularly those from developing countries notwithstanding any competitive
advantage they may enjoy.
-
Artificially
lower prices for commodities in the US provide cheap raw materials to
industrial consumers of arable commodities. In particular, livestock producers
have access to cheap feed, while industrial processors, such as ethanol and
sweetener factories, have cheap raw materials.
Yes; there is a limit of
$19.1 billion per annum (the
"AMS" limit) that the US can spend on price-linked or
production-linked subsidies. The EC's analysis is that the fixed payments, loan
programme payments, and counter-cyclical payments fall in the AMS category, as
crop-specific payments.
Assuming the US correctly classifies all expenditure, and prices continue at or
below levels seen in recent years—the Farm Bill itself is expected to have a
price-depressing effect—it is expected that the US will exceed the $19.1
billion ceiling.
More worrying from a
medium-term perspective is the lack of scope for the US to agree further cuts
in their ceiling on production- and trade-distorting subsidies.
-
Dairy farmers will receive a new subsidy dependent on
price. This will make
up 45% of the difference between a target price of $16.94 per cwt. and the
market price in Boston for Class I milk. A cap on this payment per farm is
intended to focus the measure on smaller farms of about 140 cows.
The existing market price support programme, through intervention buying of
skim milk powder (SMP) or cheese into government storage, to maintain a price
of $9.9/cwt for a defined product, is continued.
-
Sugar: producer support continues largely unchanged through high protection
against imports and a public purchasing programme using a loan rate as the basis. The penalty of
1cent/pound for loan forfeiture is eliminated, thereby
slightly increasing support.
-
Peanuts: the main vehicle of support at present is a production quota
system.
This will now be eliminated, with quota owners being compensated and instead a
loan rate, a direct and counter-cyclical payment system, will be introduced.
-
Wool / mohair / honey / chickpeas and lentils:
These sectors which were not supported under the existing farm bill (except
through ad-hoc payments) will now have a guaranteed level of support through a
loan rate and loan deficiency payment system.
-
Apples / fruit and vegetables: the
Farm Bill includes $100m to subsidise apple producers, supposedly in
compensation for low market prices in 2000, and over $200m additional funds to
purchase and distribute fruit and vegetables through various programmes.
Although the Farm Bill
contains provisions to limit subsidies under specific programmes and overall to
$360,000 per farm, a number of exceptions are introduced which may negate this
limit. In particular, a system of "crop loan certificates" has the
effect to obviate any limitation on individual LDP payments. There is no doubt
that the vast bulk of payments under the Farm Bill will go to the largest
agri-businesses, and not to the smaller-scale farms, often cited as
justification for the measures.
Under the heading of
"conservation" a number of new incentive programmes are introduced
and others are expanded. In particular:
-
NEW Conservation Security Programme ($2 billion over 6
years) will provide
payments for farmers who maintain (as yet undefined) stewardship practices or
who improve the environmental care for the land.
-
NEW Grasslands Reserve Programme ($254 million over 6
years) will pay
livestock producers who farm on grasslands. It is aimed to enrol 2 million
acres in the programme.
-
EQIP,
Environmental Quality Incentive Programme, which pays farmers who make
environmental investments to their land, including compulsory works such as to
deal with animal waste, is expanded to a level of $9 billion over 6 years or
$1.3 billion per annum (a six-fold increase compared to the current $200
million per year).
-
Other
programmes,
such as Conservation Reserve (a long-term set-aside/retirement programme; $1.5
billion/6 years) and Wetlands Reserve ($1.5 billion/6 years) and Farmland
Protection ($1.0 billion/6 years) are expanded and continued.
Yes. It is undoubtedly
preferable to spend money on pursuing legitimate public policy goals, such as
care for the environment, than on LDP and counter-cyclical programmes which
grossly distort world commodity markets.
However, one of the
great unknowns in the Farm Bill is the real content of the Conservation Title
as the Administration has yet to publish the detail of the measures. Any final
assessment will have to wait for the implementation rules.
Given the emphasis on
price-dependent policies, expenditure will fluctuate according to market price
movements. The price forecasts apparently used by the Congressional Budget
office seem to assume rising prices over the period of the Farm Bill. However,
historically, farm commodity prices have fallen in the long term and the
price-depressing effect of the Farm Bill measures themselves will push prices
to lower levels than they would have been without the measures. In a low price
scenario, as witnessed in recent years, expenditure could be very significantly
above the forecasts the US is working on.
The Secretary for
Agriculture is given powers under the Farm Bill to "make adjustments to
the maximum extent practicable" to ensure that US WTO commitments are not
exceeded, including the AMS limit of $19.1 billion. Given the difficulties of
forecasting an overshoot, a situation could occur where payments to farmers
exceeded this limit. The question would then arise what administrative action
needed to be taken. If farmers were not required to reimburse the "overshoot",
which could be politically challenging, the US could either find itself in
breach of its WTO obligations, or tempted to develop innovative reasons to
reclassify expenditure as exempt from the AMS ceiling.
The
"counter-cyclical" payments should be classified under the WTO
"amber box" as "product-specific" payments, and counted
against the US AMS commitment—that is the ceiling on annual expenditure the US
has agreed to adhere to. This is currently $19.1 billion.
However, some supporters
of the US Farm Bill say that "counter-cyclical" subsidies should be
exempt from being counted under this US subsidy ceiling, citing the "de minimis" loophole and claiming
the subsidies are "non-product specific".
Price-dependent
subsidies are classified in the "amber box" under the WTO Agreement
on Agriculture. These payments are normally counted against the member's AMS
ceiling. However, under the de minimis clause,
payments which do not exceed 5% of the value of the production for which the
payment is made are exempted from the AMS calculation. For payments which are
"non-product specific" the exemption is based on the total value of
US farm production (about $190 billion), 5% of which is about $10 billion.
In the current
negotiations in Geneva on the Agriculture Agreement, the EC has proposed to
reduce the percentage so it becomes a genuine de minimis exception. This is opposed by the US.
The Farm Bill provides
that counter-cyclical payments are paid according to the crop grown in the
reference year. Thus the payments will reflect the price movements of each of
the crops covered by the measure. The EC's analysis is that they are clearly
"crop specific" and cannot fall under the non-product specific
heading.
Supporters of the
counter-cyclical measures in the US argue, however, that since the farmer is
not required to grow the crops on which the payments are made, the payments in
some way become non-product specific. In the EC's view this argument confuses
the decoupled nature of the payment with its crop specificity. (Decoupling is a
criterion for classification under the green box—exempt payments—but since the
counter-cyclical payments are price-dependent, no one seriously argues they can
be classified under the green box.)
There is a large
question mark over the extent to which the payments will be in reality
decoupled. Since the farmer is only guaranteed the income in relation to the
crops grown in the reference year, in order to reduce risk, he or she may
choose (or the bank manager may insist) that only those crops are grown. In any
event, as indicated above, the measures are clearly not decoupled from price.
Country of origin
labelling will be introduced for meat, fruit and vegetables, fish and peanuts.
It will be introduced initially on a voluntary basis for two years and will be
obligatory from September 2004. Only meat products from animals exclusively
born, raised, slaughtered and processed in the US may be designated as US
country of origin—which raises the question how meat from the many animals
imported from Canada and Mexico each year for further fattening will be
labelled.
The detailed
implementing rules will be crucial in determining whether this is an
unwarranted impediment to trade. However, in the past the US has criticised an
EU proposal on GMO labelling and traceability in terms inconsistent with the
obligation now to be implemented for country-of-origin labelling in the US.
The Farm Bill provides
that a dairy levy will be charged on imported milk products at an equivalent
rate as the levy charged on domestic milk. The levy has until now only been
charged on domestic production and has been used to promote products like fresh
milk, which are not traded internationally. The new provision requires revenue
from levy on imported product to be kept separate and not used for promotion of
domestic product. The Bill also provides that the USTR must be consulted to
check this measure is compatible with WTO rules.
The US dairy market is
effectively closed for cheese and imports are funnelled through quotas, most of
which are full. Expansion of sales will not be possible without expansion of
quotas. Therefore, imports of dairy product cannot benefit from any expansion
of demand, even if any were to result from the promotional programmes. In this
light, the levy looks like a tariff and under WTO rules, the US may have to
negotiate an "equivalent concession" if they wish to pursue it.
Other dairy products
imported into the US, such as milk protein concentrate, are not normally used
in dairy applications, but as raw material in other processed foods and
non-food industrial production.
Compared to the Trade
Title of the FAIR Act, the main changes in the 2002 farm bill are an increase
in funding for promotion programs designed to aid in the creation, expansion
and maintenance of foreign markets for US products. These include a
progressive increase (from the current
$90 million currently to $200 million per year for the Market Access Promotion
program and from $27 million to $34.5 million for the Foreign Market
Development (Co-operator) Program).
Existing export credit
and export subsidy programmes continue (see also below).
Two new programmes are
introduced:
-
a Technical
Assistance for Specialty Crops (TASC) a mandatory $2 million funding per fiscal
year. TASC is described as an export assistance programme to address perceived
barriers that "prohibit or threaten" the export of US specialty crops. This programme could be used to provide direct assistance to overcome
health or technical barriers to trade.
-
a Biotechnology
and Agriculture Trade Program, whose purpose is to remove, resolve or mitigate
significant regulatory non-tariff barriers to the export of US agricultural
commodities. Funding levels will be appropriated through the budget process.
The new bill increases
funding available for donations to be made under programs such as "Food
for Progress" and "Food for Peace", to compensate for the stated
intention of the Administration' to phase out use of the surplus disposal
instrument, known as Section 416(b). However, the authority to use section
416(b) remains on the books, hanging over commodity markets whenever US stocks
build up.
In addition, it is
possible that alternative instruments will be used to dispose of surpluses,
such as the Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust, an emergency food reserve likely
to be revitalized and replenished to compensate for the reduction in the use of
Section 416 b.
In addition to the
increase in the minimum tonnage of commodities to be shipped out under those
food aid programmes, increased funding is foreseen to cover administration and
transportation costs, which accrue to US operators and not to recipients in
countries in need.
The Farm Bill has also
increased flexibility over monetization and extends the much-criticised
"International School Lunch Programme" (see below).
Under US food aid policy
of only using US commodities, considerable benefits flow to US commercial
interests. Commodities are purchased in the US (to the benefit for US farmers),
they may be processed in the US (to the benefit of US processors), stored in US
elevators, and transported on US-flagged vessels, before being
"monetized" or sold on a developing country market. The proceeds may
then be used for certain administrative expenses, transport and storage
incurred by the PVO (private voluntary organisation), in the country-in-need,
as well as for the purchase of (appropriate) food or for the development
project, such as rural electrification.
The risks with
monetization, and the inevitable use of donor country commodities rather than
donor country money, include that the monetized product is disposed on a
developing country market, potentially displacing local production, disrupting
local food infrastructure, depressing prices for local farmers, or displacing
legitimately traded imports.
The EU energetically
supports genuine development aid programmes, especially those aimed at
promoting food security for vulnerable populations. The EU recognizes the
considerable achievements of genuine development and food security initiatives,
including those run by US development aid professionals.
However, in addition to
the above concerns about monetization, the EC questions the quality of
development aid initiatives resulting from surplus disposal transactions.
Although one should welcome the stated priority of the new food aid provisions
to streamline, improve and clarify procedures so as to ensure better efficiency
in the food aid programs, it remains to be seen how these objectives will be
translated into practice.
Irresponsible deployment
of commodities under the cover of food aid programmes is an abuse of the
concept. The dangers include: disturbance of local markets; undermining local
agriculture; displacement of legitimate importers; suppression of entrepôt
trading (a condition of a food aid donation is often that the recipient may not
export); and circumvention of WTO rules on subsidised exports.
-
George McGovern,
as US Ambassador to FAO, spoke of a "win-win" scenario in US food aid
donations benefiting US farmers and developing country recipients. However,
this analysis ignored all the losers in the transaction, which should be
characterised as "2 winners and 10 losers".
"+"= Benefit "–"=Cost
|
PRODUCERS
|
CONSUMERS
|
|
Short run
|
Long run
|
Short run
|
Long run
|
|
Receiving Countries
|
–
|
–
|
+
|
–
|
|
Donor Countries
|
+
|
–
|
–
|
–
|
|
Rest Of the World
|
–
|
–
|
–
|
–
|
-
Food aid (wheat donations) shows very strong correlation with
prices, unrelated to need. Over
the last 20 years there has been a direct and inverse link, as shown in the
graph. This data gives a 90% correlation of changes in price and changes in
donation. For every 1% change in price, USDA responded with a 3,2% change in
donation:
-
This led the EU to demand changes to WTO
rules in the current negotiations on the Agreement on Agriculture. The current
EC proposal reads:
"It is a disgrace that food aid availability should increase when prices
are low and be curtailed when it is most needed against a background of high
commodity prices. … In certain cases, the main objective of food aid donations
seems to be to help reduce price-depressing surplus stocks… as well as
promoting market development… To a certain extent, abuse of food aid is
comparable to an export subsidy of 100%... In addition… food aid transactions
may be used to force competitors out of the market. It is therefore necessary
to adopt strict rules in order to put an end to such practices..."
-
In some
transactions, the US supplies "food aid" on credit terms—having the effect of compounding poverty and hunger by
debt.
-
The current pilot
"International School Lunch Programme" will be called the
"McGovern-Dole International Food for the Education and Child Nutrition
Program", with a mandatory $100 million for the fiscal year 2003 and
funding for subsequent years to be appropriated later. This is despite
widespread reservations, including a critical General Accounting Office audit,
and the Administration's desire to wait for evaluation of the current pilot
International School Lunch programme before taking a decision to renew.
-
The main
criticisms against the International School Lunch programme are: (a) the
requirement to buy and monetize donor-country, i.e. US, produce; (b) confused
3-fold objectives—surplus disposal, education, and nutrition; (c) no
consideration given to alternatives (such as increasing US development aid);
(d) the commodities exported may disturb local and international markets. None
of these criticisms appears to have been addressed in the Farm Bill.
The main OECD indicator
is Producer support estimate (PSE), which is for 2000 is $49 billion in the US
and $90 billion in the EU. OECD also gives "per full time farmer"
data: $20,000 in the US and $14,000 in the EU.
The cost per capita to
US citizens (Total Support Estimate, TSE) of US farm policy is
$338/capita/year. Cost per capita of the EU farm policy is $276/capita/year.
Total Support Estimate includes some measures like marketing assistance and all
types of food aid, which are used to a great extent in the US to benefit
farmers, but are excluded from the PSE calculation of farm support.
The EU and US farm
sectors produce almost the same farm-gate value: around $190 billion in 2000.
The main differences between the EU and the US are:
-
amount of
land:
EU has only 134 million ha or one-third of the farmland (which is three-times
as productive) as the US, which has 425 million ha under farm activity.
-
number of
farms:
the agriculture sector in the EU supports over 7 million farms—three-and-a-half
times the 2 million farms in the US.
|
-
|
US
|
EU
|
|
Production (farm gate
value)oecd
|
$ 190 billion
|
$ 197 billion
|
|
Number of farms
("holdings"; 1996)es
|
2 058 000 farms
|
7 370 000 farms
|
|
Farmland ("UAA"
1997)es
|
425 million ha
|
134 million ha
|
|
Average size of holding
|
207 ha
|
18 ha
|
|
Total Support
Estimate
(2000)oecd
|
$ 92.3
billion
|
$ 103.5
billion
|
|
TSE per
capita
oecd
|
$ 338
|
$ 276
|
|
TSE as % GDP oecd
|
0.92 %
|
1.32 %
|
|
Producer
Support Estimate (2000) oecd
|
$ 49.0
billion
|
$ 90.2
billion
|
|
PSE / full
time farmer equivalent oecd
|
$ 20 000
/farmer
|
$ 14 000
/farmer
|
oecd = OECD
figures for 2000; es = Eurostat figures
The opening up of the
agricultural sector is highly important to developing countries as it is often
in this field that they enjoy comparative advantage. The EU is the world's
foremost market for imports of agricultural goods from developing
countries—some 75% higher than developing country exports going to the US. The
protectionist effect of the type of farm subsidy payments made in the US—which
allow prices to slide while farmers are paid price-dependent subsidies—cannot
be underestimated.
An obverse picture is
seen in exports. The EU exports far less to developing countries than the US,
and is in fact losing world market share in products (due to restraint in use
of export measures and supply-side limiting measures). US exports, despite an
intrinsic lack of competitivity, continue to gain world market share, assisted
by a plethora of export measures.
|
$ billion
|
1998
|
1999
|
2000
|
Average 1998-2000
|
|
EU
|
37.8
|
35.8
|
33.1
|
35.5
|
|
USA
|
20.6
|
20.9
|
20.8
|
20.8
|
Agricultural imports from developing countries
|
$ billion
|
1998
|
1999
|
2000
|
Average 1998-2000
|
|
USA
|
25.3
|
23.4
|
25.7
|
24.8
|
|
EU
|
16.8
|
14.7
|
16.5
|
16.0
|
Agricultural exports to developing countries

The EU's system of export subsidies is transparent,
disciplined by WTO reduction commitments, and not a major source of trade
distortion—as confirmed in a US Department of Agriculture study. EU export
subsidies are becoming less-and-less significant, falling from 25% of the value
of farm exports in 1992 to 5% today.
US use of trade
distorting subsidised export credits
has been highlighted by OECD, which identified the US payments and long-term credits
as the source of 97% of the world’s trade-distorting export credit subsidies.
US credit subsidies are advanced on commodities which are already artificially
cheap, owing to the effects of counter-cyclical subsidies, giving considerable
leverage to this instrument. Moreover, while the WTO agreement obliged Members
to agree disciplines for use of subsidised export credits, this obligation has
not been respected.
As a result, the EU has
proposed that all officially guaranteed export credits which do not respect
commercial terms and conditions should be treated as export subsidies and
subject to a ceiling on budget guarantees and volumes. These should then be
subject to reduction commitments, similar to those applied to export subsidies.
By depressing prices,
the loan rate programme and
counter-cyclical payments provide an export subsidy on the commodities
exported. For some commodities, over 40% of US production is exported.
The EC is also concerned
that non-genuine food aid, used
primarily for surplus disposal and market opening purposes, should not escape
WTO rules on export subsidies. US use of export
tax credits for inter alia agricultural
products has been condemned by WTO as an illegal export subsidy (FSC case).